Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl\u27s Journey through the Federal Courts by Sher, Victor M.
Public Land & Resources Law Review 
Volume 14 Article 4 
June 1993 
Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey through the Federal 
Courts 
Victor M. Sher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
14 Pub. Land L. Rev. 41 (1993) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Public Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at 
University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
TRAVELS WITH STRIX: THE SPOTTED OWL'S
JOURNEY THROUGH THE FEDERAL COURTS
Victor M. Sher*
INTRODUCTION
The courtroom journeys of the northern spotted owl (strix oc-
cidentalis caurina) have both a text and a subtext. The text concerns what
the parties have alleged and what the courts have decided in a series of
cases involving several different statutes over the past five years. The story
told by this text concerns what one federal judge in 1991 called a
"remarkable series of violations of the environmental laws"' by the federal
agencies entrusted with administering our public forests and protecting
species against extinction. The text continues to unfold at all levels of the
federal judiciary, and we are still some distance from its end, although the
arrival of a new Administration holds some promise for a final resolution to
both the court proceedings and the broader controversy over the future of
the Northwest's ancient forests.'
The subtext involves a shadowy political battle in Congress in which
the Bush Administration sought for the last half-decade to obtain
exemptions from laws the courts found federal agencies were violating. In
no other context since the passage in 1969 of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)3 has Congress acted so frequently to limit citizen
enforcement of federal environmental laws against federal agencies in
federal courts as it has concerning the spotted owl.' Between 1988 and
1992, the Ninth Circuit considered two court-stripping measures embod-
ied in annual appropriations bills in six published opinions, and even the
Supreme Court stepped in to resolve one case. How Congress and the new
Administration deal with proposed legislation on spotted owls and ancient
forests will provide a strong indication of the current health of, and future
* A.B. 1976, Oberlin College; J.D. 1980 Stanford Law School. Vic Sher is the managing attorney
of the Northwest Office of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. He and his colleagues in Seattle
represent environmental groups in the cases discussed in this paper.
1. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1089 (W.D. Wash.), affid, 952 F.2d 297
(9th Cir. 1991).
2. See Tom Morganthau, et al., A Lighter Shade of Green, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1993, at 24;
Ken Miller, Owl Shows Successes, Failures of ESA, GANNET NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 2, 1993.
3. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
4. See generally Victor M. Sher & Carol S. Hunting, Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the
Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HAR. ENVTL. L.
REV. 435 (1991)(discussing congressional exemptions from environmental laws over the past twenty
years, including in the spotted owl controversy).
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prospects for, environmental law in this country.5
This article provides an overview of the spotted owl's journey through
the federal courts. Section I discusses the owl's significance as an indicator
of the health of old-growth forest ecosystems in the Pacific Northwest, and
the failure of previous federal land management strategies to protect the
species from potential extinction.
Section II analyzes lawsuits brought under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA).6 This set of lawsuits has in just over five years invoked more
provisions of the ESA - and uncovered more violations of that law by
federal agencies - than any previous litigation effort on behalf of any
species or group of species. The courts have considered (and corrected) the
federal government's failures to perform its responsibilities to add the
northern spotted owl to the list of species protected under the ESA; to
designate critical habitat for the owl; to engage in inter-agency consulta-
tion to avoid conduct likely to jeopardize the continued survival of the owl;
and to comply with NEPA in connection with the decision to designate the
owl's critical habitat. The courts have also been called on to examine the
scope of the ESA's prohibition against "harm" to a protected species.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit recently faced a challenge to the only
decision by the Endangered Species Committee to grant an exemption
from the ESA's prohibition against federal actions likely to jeopardize the
continued survival of a species.
Section III examines citizens' efforts since 1987 to compel the federal
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to address current information
about the spotted owl's plight. While for several years Congress deprived
the courts of jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims that BLM had ignored
new, significant and probably accurate information in violation of NEPA,
today BLM cannot sell timber from spotted owl habitat until it discloses,
analyzes and considers current information about the owl's plight in an
Environmental Impact Statement.
Section IV analyzes litigation against the U.S. Forest Service seeking
to preserve the owl's viability on the national forests in Oregon, Washing-
ton and northern California. Since legislation aimed at foreclosing
plaintiffs' access to the courts in this litigation expired, the Forest Service
has been enjoined from selling timber in spotted owl habitat until it
complies with the National Forest Management Act, as well as NEPA.
Finally, Section V discusses the lessons to be learned from the spotted
owl's experience in the courts. In many ways, the ancient forest controversy
5. See, e.g., Victor M. Sher, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and the Demise of Federal
Environmental Law, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,469 (1990).




in the Pacific Northwest represents an important negative role model, one
that federal agencies should strive to avoid in future decisions on managing
the public lands. The spotted owl's experience can - and must, if the new
Administration is to avoid the mistakes of its immediate predecessors -
serve as a valuable guide for approaching issues raised by other species and
other ecosystems around the country.
I. BACKGROUND: THE SPOTTED OWL'S IMPORTANCE As AN
INDICATOR OF THE HEALTH OF ANCIENT FOREST ECOSYSTEMS, AND
THE FAILURE OF EARLIER MANAGEMENT STATEGIES To PRESERVE
THE SPECIES
The northern spotted owl is a medium-sized owl with dark eyes, dark
to chestnut brown coloring, whitish spots on the head and neck, and white
mottling on the abdomen and breast. Though a secretive, nocturnal owl, it
is relatively unafraid of humans. The owl is monogamous, long-lived,
highly territorial, and site tenacious; it lives in the forests of southwestern
British Columbia, western Washington and Oregon, and northwestern
California.7 Because it is closely associated with old-growth forests, federal
agencies have considered the owl an "indicator species" for the health of
that ecosystem since the mid-1970s.8
As the court explained in Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans:
The fate of the spotted owl has become a battleground
largely because the species is a symbol of the remaining old
growth forest. As stated in the [Interagency Scientific Commit-
tee for the Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl (May
1990)] Report:
'Why all the fuss about the status and welfare of this
particular bird? The numbers, distribution, and welfare of
spotted owls are widely believed to be inextricably tied to mature
and old-growth forests. Such forests have been significantly
reduced since 1850 (mostly since 1950) by clearing for agricul-
ture, urban development, natural events such as fire and wind-
storms, and most significantly, by logging in recent decades.
Nearly all old growth has been removed on private lands. Most of
the remainder is under the management of the BLM, [U.S.
Forest Service], and [National Park Service] on Federal lands.
As its habitat has declined, the owl has virtually disappeared
from some areas and its numbers are decreasing in others.' 9
7. See generally Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990) (final rule) (codified at
50 C.F.R. § 17) [hereinafter Final Rule].
8. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1992).
9. 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (W.D. Wash.)(citing INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE, A
1993]
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Federal agencies manage nearly ninety percent of the remaining owl
habitat, the vast majority of it on Forest Service and BLM lands.' 0 The
Forest Service, which controls about seventy-four percent of the remaining
habitat, sold about 71,000 acres of owl habitat each year during the late
1980s; the BLM, which controls another twelve percent of the owl's
habitat, historically has logged an additional 15,000 acres each year."
Moreover, the vast majority of owl habitat on both Forest Service and
BLM lands is available for logging.'
In the mid-1980's scientists expressed concern about the long-term
viability of the owl as a species resulting from the cumulative adverse
effects of continued logging of its habitat. In particular, scientists increas-
ingly questioned the ability of established management policies - which
depended on establishing a network of isolated spotted owl habitat areas,
each capable of supporting one to three pairs of owls - to preserve the
species. 3 By mid-1990, population viability experts definitively rejected
this existing paradigm. Indeed, the April 1990 Report of the Interagency
Scientific Committee on the Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl
(ISC Report) described previous federal management policy as "a
prescription for the extinction of spotted owls .... "I
CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL 7 (1990)), aft'd 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.
1991). Accord, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989)("The
northern spotted owl is heavily dependant on old-growth timber for its habitat. The owl is considered an
'indicator species' for old-growth forest, meaning that the presence and number of northern spotted
owls give an accurate indication of the health of the old-growth forest and the presence of other old-
growth dependent species. As go the owls, naturalists say, so go the other species."), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1026 (1990).
10. Final Rule, supra note 7, at 26,118. The owl "may have been nearly extirpated on private
land . . . due to the reduction of old-growth habitat." Id. at 26,130.
I1. See, e.g., INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE, A CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE
NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL 14 (1990) [hereinafter ISC REPORT]; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE,
THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL: A STATUS REVIEW SUPPLEMENT 2.26 (table of owl habitat by land
ownership)(Apr. 21, 1989) [hereinafter FWS SuPP.]; Final Rule, supra note 7, at 26,130.
12. ISC REPORT, supra note 11, at 14; Final Rule, supra note 7, at 26,114.
13. This system of habitat reserves was called Spotted Owl Management Areas (SOMAs) or
Spotted Owl Habitat Areas (SOHAs). ISC REPORT, supra note I1, at 17. The federal agencies
developed their SOHA systems based on the recommendations of an interagency task force from the
late 1970s, which called for providing SOHAs of 300 acres of old-growth habitat for each of 400 owl
pairs on all land ownerships in Oregon (290 on Forest Service lands, 90 on BLM, and 20 on state and
private); the Forest Service ultimately planned to protect 551 SOHAs on its lands in Oregon and
Washington. ISC REPORT, supra note 11, at 52, 54. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F.
Supp. 1456, 1462-76 (D. Or.)(overview of the concerns that led scientists to question the adequacy of
the SOHA system to preserve the spotted owl), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990); see also FWS SuPP., supra note 1I, at 2.16; Final Rule,
supra note 7, at 26,127. See generally Victor M. Sher & Andy Stahl, Spotted Owls, Ancient Forests,
Courts and Congress: An Overview of Citizens' Efforts to Protect Old-Growth Forests and The
Species That Live in Them, 6 NW. ENVTL. J. 361, 363 (1990); ISC REPORT, supra note 1I, at 3, 39;
Final Rule, supra note 7, at 26,188-89.
14. ISC REPORT, supra note II, at 39. The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service agreed. In a 1990
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II. LITIGATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Litigation on the owl's behalf promises to address virtually every
provision affecting federal agency decisions under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA). Cases have already addressed the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service's (FWS) obligation to list a species under the Act (Northern
Spotted Owl v. Hodel);15 FWS' duty to designate critical habitat concur-
rently with listing (Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan);16 FWS' duties in
issuing biological opinions in the absence of designated critical habitat
(Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan);17 and BLM's duty to consult with FWS
concerning its guidance for timber sales in owl habitat (Lane County
Audubon Society v. Jamison).' Meanwhile, the timber industry has
review of the owl's status prepared in connection with its decision to list the owl under the ESA, FWS
concluded that the SOHA system was:
clearly not an effective way to guarantee the persistence of a predator [like the owl] that
relies upon thousands of acres of the forest environment for its year-round survival ....
We concur [with the ISC] that it is inherently very risky to reduce a geographically
widespread species to a constellation of habitat islands, most of which contain a single pair
separated from one another by intensively- managed commercial forest that may or may not
contain suitable habitat for short periods of time. Even if all SOHAs were occupied and
capable of supporting single pairs, the system would still be subject to an unacceptably high
probability of failure with the passage of years.
DAVID R. ANDERSON ET AL., FWS, 1990 STATuS REVIEW, NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL Strix
Occidentalis Caurina 55-56 (Apr. 30, 1990)[hereinafter FWS 1990 STATUS REVIEW]; see also Final
Rule, supra note 7, at 26,189-90 (discussing SOHA system, and concluding that "[e] xisting regulatory
mechanisms are insufficient to protect either the northern spotted owl or its habitat").
The ISC recommended that federal agencies adopt a very different land management strategy to
conserve the owl - one that preserves significantly greater amounts of spotted owl habitat. The
keystone of the ISC's conservation strategy is the designation of Habitat Conservation Areas (HCAs).
HCAs are "large blocks of habitat capable of supporting multiple pairs of owls and spaced closely
enough to facilitate dispersal between blocks." ISC REPORT, supra note 11, at 3. Activities detrimental
to owls - particularly logging - would be forbidden within the HCAs. Id. at 4. In addition, the ISC's
recommended strategy calls for measures to aid juvenile owl dispersal, including (1) maintaining at
least 50 percent of the forest landbase outside of HCAs in stands of timber with an average diameter at
breast height of I 1 inches or greater and at least 40 percent canopy closure (50-11-40 rule); (2)
allocation of additional lands for riparian corridors and other species; and (3) protecting acreage
around activity centers of all known pairs of owls. Id. at 4, 23-27. Finally, the ISC emphasized that its
plan hinged on complete implementation of all its component parts by state and federal agencies. Id. at
5.
While the ISC Report is widely recognized as "the first scientifically respectable proposal
regarding spotted owl conservation to come out of the executive branch," Seattle Audubon Soc'y v.
Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1092 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991), it has commanded
far from universal acceptance in the scientific community. Id. at 1093 (stating that ISC Strategy "may
or may not prove to be adequate. While it is endorsed by well-qualified scientists, it is criticized by
others, equally well-qualified, as over-optimistic and risky."); see also Seattle Audubon Soc'y v.
Mosely, 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1481-83 (W.D. Wash. 1992)(describing recent scientific criticisms).
15. 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D.Wash. 1988).
16. 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D.Wash. 1991).
17. Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, No. C88-5732 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 1991) (order denying
motion for permanent injunction).
18. 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992).
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challenged FWS' inclusion of habitat modification in the Act's definition of
"taking" (Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Lujan),1 9 and certain counties in Oregon that receive revenue from federal
timber sales have complained about FWS' failure to prepare an Environ-
mental Impact Statement concerning its designation of critical habitat for
the owl (Douglas County v. Lujan).2 ° Finally, the Ninth Circuit faced the
first challenge to the only decision ever made by the Endangered Species
Committee to allow federal actions likely to jeopardize a listed species."1
A. Obtaining Listing Protection
In early 1987 FWS received a citizen petition requesting the listing of
the owl under ESA section 4(b).22 In December 1987, FWS determined
that listing was not warranted.23 Environmental organizations filed suit
challenging the determination under the ESA and the Administrative
Procedure Act. On November 17, 1988, federal district court Judge
Thomas Zilly voided FWS' decision, holding:
[T] he Service disregarded all the expert opinion on population
viability, including that of its own expert, that the owl is facing
extinction, and instead merely asserted its expertise in support of
its conclusions. The Service has failed to provide its own or other
expert analysis supporting its conclusions.... Accordingly, the
[FWS'] decision not to list at this time the northern spotted owl
as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act
was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.2
A subsequent report by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
questioned "FWS' thoroughness and objectivity" in considering the owl's
condition.25 Among other things, GAO concluded that "FWS manage-
ment substantively changed the body of scientific evidence presented" in
19. 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992).
20. 810 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Or. 1992).
21. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993). In
1979, the ESC voted to allow the Grayrocks Dam to proceed. However, the ESC conditioned its
approval on the project complying with a FWS biological alternative that would not jeopardize the
whooping crane. See ESC, Application for Exemption for Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir (Feb. 7,
1979)); Comment, The 1978 Amendments to the Endangered Species Act: Evaluating the New
Exemption Process Under § 7, 9 ENVTL. L. 10,031, 10,033 (1979) [hereinafter ELR Comment];
infra note 66.
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (1988) (providing that if substantial scientific or commercial
information warrants the petition to list a species, the Secretary of the Interior must make a timely
decision to list or not to list the species and publish the finding in the Federal Register).
23. 52 Fed. Reg. 48,552 (1987).
24. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
25. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: SPOTTED OWL PETITION
EVALUATION BESET BY PROBLEMS 1 (1989).
[Vol. 14
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FWS' report, in an effort to support a decision not to list.2 6 Furthermore,
"factors in addition to the owl's biological condition were considered in
deciding to deny the listing petition. FWS consideration of such factors is
inconsistent with the decision-making process provided for in the [ESA]
and its implementing regulations.
'2 7
On April 25, 1989, FWS reversed itself and recommended listing the
owl as a threatened species.28 FWS concluded that listing was warranted
because of new concerns about the survival of the species in the face of
continued logging of its old-growth habitat. On June 26, 1990, the listing
decision became final.29
B. Critical Habitat
Although FWS added the spotted owl to the list of threatened species
in June 1990, the Service failed to take a crucial step the Act requires the
agency to take concurrently with listing - designating habitat critical to
the owl's survival. Section 4(a)(3) exempts FWS from the obligation to
designate critical habitat "concurrently" with listing only where it is
neither prudent nor determinable; in such circumstances, FWS may take
up to an additional year to make its critical habitat decision.30 FWS stated
in its final listing rule that critical habitat for the owl was not
determinable.31
In Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan,32 Judge Zilly determined that
FWS' failure to designate critical habitat in June 1990 violated the ESA.
Granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the court held:
this Court is unable to find any support for the federal defend-
ants' claim that critical habitat for the northern spotted owl was
not determinable in June 1989 when the Service proposed to list
the species, or when the Service issued its final rule one year later.
... The federal defendants fail to direct this Court to any portion
of the administrative record which adequately explains or
justifies the decision not to designate critical habitat for the
northern spotted owl. Nowhere in the proposed or final rules did
the Service state what efforts had been made to determine critical
habitat. Nowhere did the Service specify what additional biologi-
cal or economic information was necessary to complete the
designation. Nowhere did the Service explain why critical
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2.
28. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,666, 26,670 (1989).
29. Final Rule, supra note 7, at 26,114.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (1988).
31. Final Rule, supra note 7, at 26,124-25.
32. 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
1993]
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habitat was not determinable.... Whatever the precise contours
of the Service's obligations under the ESA, clearly the law does
not approve such conduct.
33
The court ordered FWS to submit a plan for completing its review of
critical habitat for the owl by March 15, 1991, and to publish its proposed
critical habitat rule no later than forty-five days thereafter, which was by
April 29, 199l."' Finally, the court ordered that "[t]he final rule shall be
published at the earliest possible time permitted under the appropriate
regulations."3 5
FWS' response to the court's order was to issue a proposed rule on
May 6, 199 1.6 However, FWS announced that it intended to accept public
comments, then issue a second proposed rule, then accept more public
comments, 7 and matters stalled there. Although the ESA requires FWS
to designate critical habitat "concurrently" with listing, for approximately
18 months after listing, FWS still refused to commit to any date for
reaching a final decision.
In August 1991 Judge Zilly denied plaintiffs' request for an injunction
prohibiting FWS from issuing biological opinions under ESA section
7(a)(2) until the Service designated critical habitat.38 Also in August,
FWS stated that it intended to publish a final designation by December 14,
1991.a9 However, in late November 1991 the Service asked for permission
to defer the designation until June 1992.40 FWS based its request on the
anticipated release of a recovery plan during the spring of 1992.41
Holding that defendants "have not adequately shown that further
delays [in designating critical habitat] are justified," the court denied
FWS' request for more time.' 2 On January 15, 1992, FWS issued its final
designation of critical habitat.' 3 However, the owl's critical habitat
situation remains far from final. On December 22, 1992, the district court
33. Id. at 627-28.
34. Id. at 629-30.
35. Id. at 630.
36. 56 Fed. Reg. 20,816 (1991).
37. Id.
38. Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, No. C88-5732 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 199 l)(order denying
motion for permanent injunction).
39. Declaration of Jean E. Williams In Support of Motion to Shorten Time at 1, Northern
Spotted Owl v. Lujan, No. C88-573Z (W.D. Wash. Nov. 29, 1991); see 56 Fed. Reg. 40,002
(1991)(second proposed designation of critical habitat).
40. Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, No. C88-573Z, slip. op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23,
1991)(order denying request for more time).
41. Id. at 2-3. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0 (1988)(("secretary shall develop and implement
[recovery plans] for the conservation and survival of endangered species and threatened species...
unless he finds that such a plan will not promote the conservation of the species.").
42. Northern Spotted Owl, No. C88-573Z, slip. op. at 4 (order denying request for more time).
43. 57 Fed. Reg. 1796 (1992)(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17)(effective Feb. 14, 1992).
[Vol. 14
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in Oregon held that FWS must - but failed to - comply with NEPA
procedures in designating critical habitat." The court accordingly "set/]
aside the designation of critical habitat," 45 but reserved the issue of
appropriate relief.
4"
C. Failure To Consult
In September 1990, following FWS' decision to list the owl as
threatened, the BLM announced by press release that it had adopted what
it called the "Jamison Strategy," to protect the owl and provide for
continued logging of its habitat.47 The Jamison Strategy contained
"management guidelines" for the spotted owl for Fiscal Years 1991 and
1992, including a program to offer 750 million board feet of timber for sale
in each of the next two years.48 While the Strategy left in place current land
use allocations for uses other than logging, it substantially changed
existing BLM timber management guidelines.49
BLM never consulted with FWS under ESA section 7 (a) (2) concern-
ing whether sales offered pursuant to the Jamison Strategy might jeopard-
ize the spotted owl. 50 Instead, in January 1991, BLM submitted a set of
44. Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Or. 1992).
45. Id. at 1484 n.7.
46. Id. at 1485.
47. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL FY 1991 THROUGH FY 1992 (1990) [hereinafter JAMISON STRAT-
EGY]. Cy Jamison was the Director of BLM under former President Bush.
48. Id. at 1.
49. BLM stated that it intended the Jamison Strategy to "respond" to FWS' listing of the owl
under the ESA. According to the Bureau, BLM "has called for the immediate implementation of [the
Jamison Strategy], which will direct BLM management of western Oregon forest lands into FY 1994
and beyond." Id. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Lane County Audubon Society v. Jamison:
The BLM itself described its Jamison Strategy as an 'interim stragegy' to be carried
out while new management plans are prepared. The Strategy outlines in detail the various
criteria that will be used to develop the 1991 and 1992 timber sales. It develops a 'detailed
management strategy' to be carried out in four phases to cover fiscal years 1990 through
1994 'and beyond.' Like the [existing Timber Management Plans], it establishes total
annual allowable harvests. The impact of each individual sale on owl habitat cannot be
measured without reference to the management criteria established in the TMPs and the
Jamison Strategy.
958 F.2d 290,294 (9th Cir. 1992). See also JAMISON STRATEGY, supra note 47, at app. A (guidelines
for managing lands previously allocated to timber production).
Although the owl management component of the Jamison Strategy was based largely on the ISC's
recommendations, it rejected at least three key components of the ISC plan. Cf. supra note 14
(elements of ISC plan). First, the Jamison Strategy was a far cry from the comprehensive, long-term
owl management strategy called for by the ISC; indeed, the Strategy only committed BLM to protect
owl habitat "over the next two years .. " Second, the Jamison Strategy abandoned the ISC's
guidelines for protecting dispersal habitat for spotted owls, i.e., the "50-11-40 rule." Third, although
the ISC called for no logging in Habitat Conservation Areas established under its plan, the Jamison
Strategy contemplated salvage sales in such areas. See JAMISON STRATEGY, supra note 47, at 5.
50. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). That section of the ESA provides that each federal
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more than 170 individual timber sales that it determined "may affect" the
owl to FWS, and requested formal consultation with FWS on these
individual sales.51 In early 1991 environmental groups sued BLM to
compel consultation on the underlying Strategy.52
FWS' Biological Opinion concluded that the Jamison Strategy "does
not sufficiently protect spotted owls."53 Even so, when FWS examined the
sales individually (as BLM had insisted), FWS found that about one-third
of the sales would likely jeopardize the owl, one-third would not, and the
remaining one-third would not if modified. 4
BLM contended that its adoption of the Jamison Strategy did not
constitute a federal "action" that would trigger ESA section 7(a)(2)'s
consultation requirement. However, on September 11, 1991, federal
district court Judge Robert Jones disagreed. He held that BLM violated
section 7 by failing to consult on the Jamison Strategy, and enjoined
implementation of the Strategy.5 However, reasoning that individual
timber sales were offered under preexisting management plans, the court
declined to enjoin individual sales. 56
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge Jones that" 'without
a doubt,' the Jamison Strategy... was... an agency action [that] falls
squarely within the definition of agency action" requiring consultation
under ESA section 7(a)(2).57 The court also held that BLM's attempt to
rely on the preexisting management plans for individual timber sales "is
not a tenable position," because "the BLM's reinstatement of the TMPs
would also constitute" agency action under section 7(a)(2) .58 The court
concluded:
In sum, neither the underlying TMPs nor the Jamison 'interim
management strategy' has ever been submitted to FWS for
agency must consult with the Secretary of the Interior to determine that its action "is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.., unless such agency has been granted
an exemption."
51. FWS, FORMAL CONSULTATION ON 174 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT FISCAL YEAR 1991
TIMBER SALES (June 17, 1991)(as amended July 3, 1991) [hereinafter FWS 1991 OPINION].
52. See Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992).
53. FWS 1991 OPINION, supra note 51, at 18.
54. Id. passim.
55. Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, No.91-6123-JO, 1991 WL 354885, at *2 (D. Or.
Sept. 11, 1991).
56. Id. at *3.
57. Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 294 (9th Cir. 1992). FWS
regulations define "action" broadly to include "all activities or programs of any kind authorized,
funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies ...." 50 C.F.R. § 402.2 (1992).
Examples include "actions intended to conserve listed species or their habitat, . . . actions directly or
indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or air." Id.
58. Lane County, 958 F.2d at 295.
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consultation pursuant to the mandate of the ESA. Accordingly,
the individual sales cannot go forward until the consultation
process is complete on the underlying plans which BLM uses to
drive their development.5 9
The Ninth Circuit issued an injunction halting all futher BLM sales
that may affect the spotted owl pending BLM's compliance with its
consultation obligations.60 Moreover, the court of appeals reiterated its
desire that BLM undertake such consultation forthwith. 61 Finally, the
court remanded to Judge Jones to determine whether remaining fiscal year
1991 sales should be enjoined permanently.62 On January 21, 1993, Judge
Jones permanently enjoined all of BLM's unoffered sales that might affect
spotted owls.
63
D. The God Squad
In September 1991 the BLM asked the Secretary of Interior to
convene the Endangered Species Committee (ESC) (also known as the
"God Squad") under ESA section 7 to consider an exemption for 44 BLM
Fiscal Year 1991 timber sales under the Jamison Strategy. 4 FWS had
determined these sales would likely jeopardize the continued survival of the
northern spotted owl. In May 1992 the ESC granted BLM's exemption as
to thirteen of the sales.65 The decision, the first ever to allow the federal
government deliberately to jeopardize a listed species under the ESA
following a contested proceeding before the ESC, 6 was challenged by
59. Id.
60. Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, No. 91-36019 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 1992)(order).
61. Id.
62. Lane County, 958 F.2d at 295.
63. Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, No. 91-6123-JO (D. Or. Jan. 21, 1993)(opinion
and order).
64. See generally Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th
Cir. 1993)(describing exemption process).
65. ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE, APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION BY THE BUREAU OF
LAND MANAGEMENT TO CONDUCT 44 TIMBER SALES IN WESTERN OREGON 6-7 (May 15, 1992).
66. Until its decision in May 1992 to grant an exemption to the BLM, the ESC had only been
convened twice since its creation in 1978. The ESC considered both previous applications under the
procedures that preceded the current provisions in 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-%l(1988), see Pub. L. No. 95-
632. 92 Stat. 3751 (Nov. 10, 1978) (adding original exemption procedures to 16 U.S.C. § 1536), and
the ESC never granted an exemption following a contested proceeding. The first time Congress
directed the ESC to consider an exemption was for the Tellico Dam and Reservoir, a project that had
been halted as a result of the famous "snail darter" litigation culminating in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), which led directly to creation of the ESC in the 1978
amendments. See ELR Comment, supra note 21, at 10,032. Congress short-circuited the application,
threshold determinations and adjudicatory processes, and also told the ESC to consider only two of the
three criteria otherwise applicable to exemption decisions. Id. at 10,033. Despite the greased wheels,
the ESC unanimously denied the application. Id. (citing Endangered Species Committee, Application
for Exemption for Tellico Dam and Reservoir (Feb. 7, 1979)). Congress, however, ultimately
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environmental groups (petitioners) in the Ninth Circuit in Portland
Audubon Society v. Endangered Species Committee.7
Petitioners challenged the ESC's decision on a plethora of both
procedural and substantive flaws in the BLM's application for an exemp-
tion, the Secretary of Interior's decision to convene the ESC, and the ESC's
decision, only three of which will be discussed here. First, petitioners
alleged that BLM violated the predicate requirements of ESA section
7(g)(3)(A)(i), which requires an agency to engage in good faith consulta-
tion with FWS before applying for an exemption from the God Squad.68 In
particular, petitioners asserted that BLM failed to examine the effects of
its timber sale program as a whole, instead improperly segmenting its
intended conduct by focussing exclusively on individual timber sales for a
single year.
Ironically, BLM submitted its God Squad application, which rested
on the Jamison Strategy, on September 11, 1991- the same day Judge
Jones declared BLM in violation of the ESA's consultation requirement for
the Jamison Strategy.69 Indeed, in Lane County Audubon Society v.
Jamison,"0 the Ninth Circuit firmly and definitively rejected BLM's
approach, and enjoined future BLM timber sales (including those at issue
in BLM's exemption application), precisely because BLM never consulted
with FWS on its overall timber sale program.7 1 While the ESC refused to
reexamine the adequacy of BLM's consultation,7 2 Lane County Audubon
Society established conclusively that BLM never complied with this
crucial, statutory pre-condition to obtaining an exemption.73 Petitioners
overturned the ESC's decision by way of an obscure provision in an appropriations bill. See Sher &
Hunting, supra note 4, at 441-44.
The second time Congress directed the ESC to consider an exemption was for the Grayrocks Dam
project on the Platte River. The ESC ultimately issued a decision allowing the project to proceed. See
ELR Comment, supra note 21, at 10,033 (citing Endangered Species Committee, Application for
Exemption for Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir (Feb. 7, 1979)). However, as with the Tellico Dam,
Congress short-circuited the application process and threshold adjudication, and, in addition, expressly
required that the project be modified to avoid jeopardizing the endangered whooping crane. Id.
Moreover, litigation over the dam settled while the application was pending before the ESC, and so the
exemption "was a foregone conclusion." Id. Although the ESC granted the exemption, conditioned on
adoption of the conditions of the settlement agreement, it is questionable whether an exemption was
even necessary given the modified nature of the project. Id.
67. 984 F.2d 1534, 1537 (9th Cir. 1993)(petition filed June 10, 1992).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(3)(A)(i) (1988).
69. Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, No. 91-6123-JO, 1991 WL 354885 (D. Or. Sept.
II, 1991)(order granting summary judgment). See supra text accompanying notes 55-62.
70. 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992).
71. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
72. See Bureau of Land Management v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, ESA 91-1, at 5 (U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, Dec. 11, 1991)(order removing question of BLM's consultation performance
from ESC consideration "because the question is already at issue before the Court of Appeals.").
73. 958 F.2d at 294-95. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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contended that the exemption must therefore be reversed as a matter of
law.
Second, petitioners asserted that BLM violated ESA section 7(k),
which requires that "an environmental impact statement which discusses
the impacts upon endangered species or threatened species or their critical
habitats shall have been previously prepared with respect to any agency
action exempted." 74 The inadequacy of BLM's consideration of the effects
of its timber sale program on the spotted owl has been in federal court since
198 7 .75 In 1989, federal district court Judge Helen Frye determined that
BLM lacked such an EIS, but held that the courts could not grant relief
because Congress had temporarily deprived them of jurisdiction over such
claims. 71 In 1992, however, the same court granted summary judgment for
the plaintiffs, holding that BLM's existing EISs were not adequate, and
that the issue of the effects of BLM's Timber Management Plans on the
long-range survival of the northern spotted owl subspecies should be
addressed by BLM under NEPA.77 As with BLM's failure to consult
properly on its timber sale programs, BLM's failure to satisfy a mandatory
statutory prerequisite to an exemption has already been established by the
federal courts.
Third, petitioners asserted that the entire ESC hearing suffered from
fundamental procedural flaws. From the outset, the Secretary of Interior
characterized the proceeding as a "rule making," rather than an "adjudi-
cation" under the Administrative Procedure Act.7" Accordingly, as a
direct result of applying the wrong APA standard, the Secretary failed to
take steps to protect against improper exparte contacts between decisional
staff, individuals involved in closely related litigation, and third parties. 9
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(k) (1988).
75. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, No. 87-1160-FR (D. Or.)(complaint filed Oct. 19,
1987). In 1992, the court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their N EPA claim. Portland
Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992).
76. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1461, 1485 (D. Or.), af'd in part,
rev'd in part, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990).
77. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489, 1501-02. See infra note 116 and
accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Memorandum from Tom Sansonetti, Counsel, Endangered Species Committee, to
Harvey C. Sweitzer, Administrative Law Judge 4 (Jan. 13, 1992)(copy on file with author).
Accordingly, the Secretary concluded that the procedural requirements for the exemption process "are
much less stringent than those required in an adjudication." Id. at 6.
79. The two key elements of formal adjudicatory hearings under the Administrative Procedure
Act are (1) assuring an absence of exparte communications with decisionmakers so that the decision
can be made "on the record," 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(a), 557(d) (1988); and (2) assuring that there is a clear
separation of functions between investigative and prosecutorial staff, on the one hand, and deci-
sionmakers on the other. § 554(d)(2). Under the first of these standards, an agency employee
"engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency may not, in that or
a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review,
except as a witness or counsel in public proceedings." § 554(d). In enacting this provision, Congress
19931
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Similarly, petitioners alleged, the ESC blurred "prosecutorial" and
"decisional" functions among and within affected federal agencies.
Petitioners pointed to a number of significant irregularities in the
ESC's consideration of BLM's exemption application. For example, then-
Solicitor of Interior Thomas Sansonetti wore at least four different hats
during the proceeding: He was simultaneously counsel for BLM in closely-
related pending litigation involving BLM's NEPA duties (Portland
Audubon Society v. Lujan) and BLM's ESA duties (Lane County
Audubon Society v. Jamison), counsel for the ESC, counsel for the
administrative law judge conducting the evidentiary hearing, and chief
counsel for the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (an Interior agency which
opposed BLM's application for an exemption)."0 The multiple roles played
by Solicitor Sansonetti exacerbated the confused procedural posture of the
intended to preclude from decision-making in a particular case not only individuals with the title of
"investigator" or "prosecutor," but all persons who had, in that or a factually-related case, been
involved with exparte information or who had developed by prior involvement a" 'will to win.' "Utica
Packing Co. v. Block, 781 F.2d 7I,76 (6th Cir. 1986); Grolier, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 615 F.2d
1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). As the court explained in D.C. Fed'n of
Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246-47 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972),
"the appearance of bias or pressure may be no less objectionable than the reality." Accord, e.g.,
Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir.
1970) ("an administrative hearing 'must be attended not only with every element of fairness but with
the very appearance of complete fairness.' ").
The prohibition on ex parte communications, in turn, stems from the APA's requirement that
decisions be based on "the whole record." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). The exparte prohibition is set forth
in 5U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (1988), which is a "broad provision that prohibits any ex parte communica-
tions relevant to the merits of an agency proceeding between 'any member of the body comprising the
agency' or any agency employee who 'is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional
process' and any 'interested person outside the agency.'" Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered
Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1539 (9th Cir. 1993). The purpose of the ex parte communications
prohibition "is to ensure that 'agency decisions required to be made on a public record are not
influenced by private, off-the-record communications from those personally interested in the
outcome.' "Id. In Professional AirTraffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d
547 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court emphasized the pernicious nature of ex parte communications:
We think it a mockery ofjustice to even suggest that judges or other decisionmakers may be
properly approached on the merits of a case during the pendency of an adjudication.
Administrative and judicial adjudications are viable only so long as the integrity of the
decisionmaking process remains inviolate. There would be no way to protect the sanctity of
the adjudicatory process if we were to condone direct attempts to influence decisionmakers
through ex parte contacts.
Id. at 570.
80. Solicitor Sansonetti conferred frequently - and secretly - with the administrative law
judge (ALJ) charged under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g) (1988) with conducting an impartial evidentiary
hearing to compile the record for the ESC's ultimate decision. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at
20, Bureau of Land Management, ESA 91-1 (U.S. Dep't of Interior, Dec. 3-4, 1991 )(ALJ would "be in
conference from time to time" with Solicitor); id. at 53-60, 272-76 (concerns by Portland Audubon
Society regarding improper tainting of record from such contacts). By playing these multiple
schizophrenic roles in both the ESC's deliberations and closely related litigation against BLM, the
Solicitor seriously undercut any separation between advocacy and decisional functions within the
Department of the Interior.
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evidentiary hearing on BLM's application. They also led to some highly
questionable rulings by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), a1 outright
reversals in positions taken by FWS in the exemption proceeding to protect
BLM's position on closely-related issues in pending litigation,82 and even
apparent interference with the intervention by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency.83
These events called into question the fundamental fairness of the
81. For example, the ALJ removed the question of whether the BLM should have consulted on
the overall Jamison strategy from the proceeding. Bureau of Land Management, ESA 91-1 at 5 (U.S.
Dep't of Interior, Dec. 1I, 1991). This decision rested directly on the Secretary's (and Solicitor's)
litigation position on behalf of the BLM in Lane County Audubon Society: "Said question may not be
considered in this proceeding because the question is already at issue before the Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit, on appeal of Lane County Audubon Society v. Janison, Civ. No. 91-6123-HO (D. Or.
Sept. 11, 1991)." Id. Of course, when the ALJ entered this order, BLM was enjoined from
implementing the Jamison Strategy because the district court in Lane County Audubon Society
explicitly held that BLM's failure to consult on the Strategy violated 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
These circumstances raised the possibility that BLM's litigation situation may have influenced the
ALJ's decision on certain key threshold issues in the ESC proceedings.
82. In early December 1991, FWS filed a motion with the ALJ to certify certain issues to the
ESC itself. FWS argued, among other things, that BLM's failure to consult on the Jamison Strategy
required the ESC to deny BLM's application. See Memorandum in Support of FWS Motion to Certify
Two Jurisdictional Questions to the Endangered Species Committee (Dec. 9, 1991) (copy on file).
Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs in Lane Countj' Audubon Society attached a copy of FWS' papers to their
reply brief in the pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit. FWS subsequently filed with the ESC a Notice
stating that the "legal argument" made in the December 9 FWS Motion to Certify "is in conflict with
the position of the Department of the Interior in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals in
Lane County Audubon Society v. Jamison." Bureau of Land Management, ESA 91-1, at I (U.S. Dep't
of the Interior, Dec. 20, 199 I)(Notice of Limited Withdrawal of Jurisdictional Issue). FWS therefore
"withdr[ew] that portion of the December 9 brief subject to a decision by the Court of Appeals." Id.
83. EPA's Office of Federal Activities (OFA) intervened in the ESC proceedings. OFA's
participation carried special significance, since it is the office within EPA delegated the responsibility
for carrying out EPA's charge under 42 U.S.C. § 7609 to review the adequacy of federal agencies'
compliance with NEPA. This issue was central to the ESC's deliberations (under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(k)
(1988)), as well as to BLM's litigation position on its NEPA compliance at issue in Portland Audubon
Society v. Lujan (then pending in Oregon district court). On December 27, 1991, EPA submitted
testimony concluding, among other things, that BLM's refusal to address significant new information
about the spotted owl in a supplemental EIS failed to satisfy its NEPA obligations. See Letter from
Richard E. Sanderson, Director, Office of Federal Activities, to D. Dean Bibles, Oregon State Director,
Bureau of Land Management 2 (Dec. 27, 1991)(copy on file with author) ("there is significant new
information bearing directly on the [BLM's timber] sales' potential environmental impacts, including
but not limited to effects on the northern spotted owl, which warrants preparation of one or more
supplemental ElSs. Based on our review of the [existing] timber management ElSs.... the present
documentation prepared for the proposed sales is inadequate to satisfy NEPA requirements.").
On January 8, 1992, however, literally as the evidentiary hearing was about to start, OFA moved
to withdraw from the proceedings. The purported basis for the withdrawal was an arrangement
between decisional staff- EPA's acting General Counsel and the Solicitor of Interior - regarding a
"process" that would supposedly address the prosecutorial staff's concerns that led to OFA's
intervention in the first place. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, at 548, Bureau of Land
Management v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, ESA 91-1, (U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Dec. 3-4,
1991 ) (referencing letter from counsel for ESC to Acting General Counsel of EPA (Jan. 3, 1991 ))(copy
on file with author).
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ESC's deliberations. As an editorial in the Portland Oregonian put it:
When it comes to confusing the spotted owl issue, the federal
government is on a roll it just can't stop....
Most recently, the Environmental Protection Agency re-
moved itself as a participant in the proceedings. That came after
the agency submitted, then withdrew, testimony highly critical
of BLM's assessment of the risk its logging would pose to the owl.
Earlier, high-level officials ordered the lawyer for the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service to drop one of its legal arguments against
the BLM position.
All this increases the suspicion that the Bush administration
is manipulating the input before a federal hearings judge so the
output will be favorable to the timber industry, irrespective of the
facts of the matter....
[T]he committee should not accept as an option a timber
harvest strategy that makes the extinction of the owl or other
species a significant probability.
And it most assuredly should not play God with the
proceedings by allowing the facts to be slanted before they ever
get to a decision.84
When citizens challenged the ESC's exemption decision in Portland
Audubon Society v. Endangered Species Committee, 5 BLM would not
have been able to sell the sales exempted by the ESC anytime soon.
8
6
Moreover, in Februrary 1993, the Ninth Circuit granted petitioners'
request for a formal evidentiary hearing into whether members of former
President Bush's staff engaged in improper ex parte contacts intended to
persuade members of the ESC to grant BLM's exemption.87 In granting
the request for an evidentiary hearing, the court squarely held that the
ESC's decisions "are adjudicatory in nature."88 This ruling demolished the
entire procedural framework under which the ESC considered BLM's
application.
On April 19, 1993, BLM threw in the towel. In a letter to Secretary of
Interior Bruce Babbitt, BLM's Acting Director stated: "Upon further
consideration, the BLM has decided to abandon its plan to go forward with
84. PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 12, 1992, at C-8.
85. 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993).
86. Court injunctions in two other cases enjoined BLM from proceeding with these and other
sales in spotted owl habitat because of violations of the ESA and N EPA. See Lane County Audubon
Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992)(ESA); supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text;
Portland Audubon Soc'yv. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Or.), modifiedinpart, No. 87-1160-FR, 1992
WL 176353 (D. Or. July 16, 1992)(NEPA); infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
87. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536 (9th Cir.
1993).
88. Id. at 1541.
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the 13 proposed sales that the Committee voted to exempt from the ESA.
Accordingly, BLM hereby withdraws its request for exemption for timber
sales from the Committee."8 9 BLM promised it would "offer to sell timber
from the lands we manage only when consistent with the ESA and the other
requirements of law ... -90 Finally, BLM stated its hope that "by sweeping
away any impact [of the ESC's decision] BLM has cleared the decks for
constructive, forward-looking consideration of the complex issues arising
out of old growth forest management." 91 The same day, Secretary Babbitt,
in his role as chairman of the ESC, acknowledged BLM's withdrawal of the
exemption application,92 and the ESC immediately moved to dismiss
Portland Audubon Society's petition for review as moot.9 3 On June 3, 1993
the Ninth Circuit granted the ESC's motion,94 closing this chapter of ESA
implementation.
E. Other Pending or Potential Litigation
More spotted owl litigation is either underway or forthcoming under
the ESA. First, the timber industry filed a lawsuit seeking to invalidate
FWS' regulations defining "harm" to listed species to include significant
habitat modification, a contention rejected by the district court, 95 and
currently on appeal to the D.C. Circuit.
Second, in Douglas County v. Lujan,96 certain counties in Oregon that
receive revenues from federal timber sales seek to invalidate FWS'
designation of critical habitat for the spotted owl for failing to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA. On December 22, 1992,
federal district court Judge Michael Hogan granted the counties' motion
for summary judgment, holding that FWS violated NEPA by failing to
89. Letter from Michael Penfold, Acting Director, BLM, to Bruce Babbitt, Chair, ESC (Apr.
19, 1993) (copy on file with author).
90. Id.
91. Id. BLM's press release noted that the Ninth Circuit's ruling would have required an ALJ to
"hold hearings on whether the Bush Administration improperly meddled in the deliberations of the so-
called 'God Squad.'" BLM Withdraws Exemption Request, NEws RELEASE (Dep't of the Interior,
Wash. D.C.), Apr. 19, 1993 (copy on file with author). BLM, however, explained that the new
Administration "is not interested in looking backwards or in resurfacing allegations about the previous
Administration." Id. Rather, "the more important move was to forge greater consensus in forest
management practices of the BLM and the U.S. Forest Service." Id.
92. Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of Interior and Chairman, ESC, to Michael Penfold,
Acting Director, BLM (Apr. 19, 1993) (copy on file with author).
93. See Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species
Comm., No. 92-40736 (9th Cir.) (filed Apr. 19, 1993).
94. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., No. 92-40736 (9th Cir. June 3,
1993)(order granting motion to dismiss).
95. SeeSweet Home Chapterof Communities fora Great Oregon v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.
D.C. 1992).
96. 810 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Or. 1992).
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determine whether an EIS was necessary or not in connection with its
designation of critical habitat."
The courts have either examined or are now examining virtually all
facets of federal implementation of the ESA in connection with the spotted
owl. This judicial legacy will provide important guidance for future
conduct regarding other species, from initial listing to God Squad
determinations.
III. THE BLM, § 314, AND NEPA
A. 1987-1991
In October 1987, environmental groups filed suit in Oregon challeng-
ing BLM's on-going timber sales in spotted owl habitat under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),98 the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA,) 99 the Oregon & California Lands Act (OCLA), 0 and the
Federal Land Policy & Management Act (FLPMA).' 0' This discussion
focuses on plaintiffs' NEPA claims.'
In February 1987, following requests from environmental groups to
prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) under
NEPA to address new information about the spotted owl, BLM prepared
an Environmental Assessment (EA) to consider the need for an updated
analysis.' 03 BLM, however, declined to prepare an SEIS.' 0 ' While the EA
revealed the Agency's plans to offer more than 200 timber sales within
known owl habitat over the next three years, 10 5 BLM failed even to mention
any of the new information reflecting the scientific community's increased
concerns about the owl's situation. In October 1987 environmental groups
filed suit, seeking to enforce NEPA. 06
97. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70c (1988).
99. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (1988).
100. 43 U.S.C. § 1181 (1988).
101. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1988).
102. Plaintiffs' claims under OCLA and FLPMA concerned whether the BLM had discretion
under those statutes to protect species not listed under the ESA. When the owl became listed in 1990,
plaintiffs abandoned these claims. Plaintiffs' claims under the MBTA were essentially the same as
those raised in Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans. 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash.), aft'd, 952 F.2d
297 (9th Cir. 1991). See infra discussion sec. IV. B.
103. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F.Supp. 1456, 1460 (D. Or.), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990); BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, SPOTTED OWL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (1987)(copy on file with author)
[hereinafter SPOTTED OWL EAI.
104. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, RECORD OF DECISION 3 (1987)(copy on file with
author).
105. SPOTTED OWL EA, supra note 103, at app. C.
106. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210, 21,211
(D. Or. Apr. 20, 1988)(complaint filed Oct. 19, 1987), affd 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989); Portland
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Within two months after the lawsuit was filed, Congress enacted a
"rider" to the Department of the Interior Appropriations Act for fiscal
year 1988.107 This provision, section 314, which Congress reenacted
without change each of the next two years, allowed the BLM to continue
managing its lands under existing timber management plans, and stated:
Nothing shall limit judicial review of particular activities on
these lands: Provided, however, That there shall be no challenges
to any existing plan... [with respect to BLM] solely on the basis
that the plan does not incorporate information available subse-
quent to the completion of the existing plan: Provided further,
That any and all particular activities to be carried out under
existing plans may nevertheless be challenged.1"8
This contradictory language, which the court of appeals later called
"anything but clear," 109 has been the subject of five published Ninth
Circuit opinions. 110
In April 1988, district court Judge Helen Frye relied on section 314 to
dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, holding that section 314 prevented the
federal courts from hearing the case.' The Ninth Circuit reversed."' The
Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489, 1492-96 (D. Or.) (setting forth procedural history of case),
modified in part, No. 87-1160-FR, 1992 WL 176353 (D. Or. July 16, 1992).
107. Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 314, 101
Stat. 1329-254 (1987), reenacted without change in Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-446, § 314, 102 Stat. 1774, 1825-26 (1988),
and for fiscal year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 312, 103 Stat. 701, 743 (1989).
108. Id.
109. Portland Audubon Soc'yv. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1026 (9th Cir. 1990).
110. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991); Headwaters v. Bureau of
Land Management, 914 F.2d 1174(9th Cir. 1990), reh "gdenied, 940 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1991); Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 895 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990);
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990);
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 911 (1989). Two of
these cases did not involve new information about spotted owls. In Mohla, plaintiffs challenged a single
Forest Service timber sale on the grounds that the agency had ignored singificant new information
concerning the ecological significance of old-growth forests. The district court dismissed, holding the
claim was barred by section 314. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envt.
L. Inst.) 21,177 (D. Or. May 25 1989). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that if ONRC won this
case, it could use that victory as a basis for a challenge to other sales on the forest, and that such
challenges "would amount to an attack on the entire plan as outdated," a result forbidden by section
314. Mohla, 895 F.2d at 630.
In Headwaters, plaintiff alleged that logging on certain BLM lands would increase fire hazards by
removing fire-resistant old-growth. Relying on its earlier opinion in Mohla, the Ninth Circuit held that
section 314 barred this claim, since the complaint raised issues "which also could be equally applicable
to all sales under the management plan." 914 F.2d at 1179. See generally Sher & Hunting, supra note
4, at 452-70 (discussing Hodel, Lujan, and Mohla).
Ill. Portland Audubon Soc'yv. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210 (D. Or. Apr.
20, 1988).
112. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 911
TRAVELS WITH STRIX
Had Congress intended to keep the restrictions of section
314 in place more than a year at a time, it could have so provided
or enacted the instructions as part of permanent, substantive
legislation. It would not have proceeded to consider the provision
on an annual basis for three years in a row.
The plaintiffs should have been granted leave to amend their
complaint to allege NEPA claims no longer barred by the annual
appropriations act restrictions originally adopted as Section
314.125
The Ninth Circuit's ruling finally cleared the way for plaintiffs to present
the merits of their claims - albeit more than four years after they filed
their complaint.
B. BLM Finally Faces the Music
Following the Ninth Circuit's ruling, plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Judge Frye granted the temporary restraining order on
January 30, 1992,126 and the preliminary injunction on February 19,
1992.127 On June 8, 1992, the court granted plaintiffs summary judgment
and issued a permanent injunction against further BLM timber sales in
spotted owl habitat unless and until the Bureau complies with NEPA.128
The court explained:
This court has heretofore reviewed the decision of the BLM.
•. not to prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact State-
ment and has ruled that that decision was an arbitrary and
capricious decision. The BLM has known since May 18, 1989
that, in this court's opinion, the existing Environmental Impact
Statements were not adequate, and the issue of the effects of the
[BLM's] Timber Management Plans on the long-range survival
of the northern spotted owl subspecies should be addressed by the
BLM under NEPA.
12 9
The court rejected BLM's contention that its experts were entitled to
deference in deciding whether or not current information about the spotted
owl required updating the agency's EISs:
125. Id. at 304.
126. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, No. 87-1160-FR (D. Or. Jan. 30, 1992)(temporary
restraining order).
127. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 784 F. Supp. 786 (D. Or. 1992)(order and opinion
granting motion for preliminary injunction).
128. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992), modified in part, No.
87-1160-FR, 1992 WL 176353 (D. Or. July 16, 1992).
129. Id. at 1505.
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It is not up to the court to evaluate or to discount the opinions of
responsible experts in a scientific field. It is the duty of the BLM
[under NEPA] to identify, evaluate and address the new infor-
mation, allow public comment, and formulate its plans accord-
ingly. The only credible conclusion to be reached in this contro-
versy, regardless of which "responsible experts" the court
chooses to believe, is that NEPA requires the public to be
involved, and the BLM has not followed procedures to allow the
public to be involved.'30
Finally, the court also rejected BLM's argument that the Bureau
should nonetheless be allowed to proceed with timber sales, notwithstand-
ing its violations of NEPA:
This court cannot evaluate the risks that particular timber
sales pose to the survival of the northern spotted owl subspecies
using the existing Timber Management Plans which do not
address the issue of the long-range survival of the northern
spotted owl subspecies or contain any plan for long-range
management of the northern spotted owl subspecies on BLM
lands ....
... This court cannot do what the process of preparing the
Timber Management Plans and an Environmental Impact
Statement is intended to accomplish ....
... The purpose of requiring a Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement is to 'ensure[] that the agency will not act on
incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is too
late to correct.'Marsh v. ONRC, [ 109 S.Ct. 1851, 1858 (1989)].
Going forward with timber sales without the preparation of a
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement ... is directly
contrary to that purpose ....
There is no defense for the BLM's failure to comply with
NEPA, and there will be no opportunity for the BLM to comply
with NEPA after the agency's proposed actions are taken ...
On December 21, 1987, Congress explicitly directed that
'[t]he . . . Bureau of Land Management [is] to continue to
complete as expeditiously as possible development of . . .
Resource Management Plans to meet all applicable statutory
requirements.' Section 314 of the Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101
Stat. 1329 (1987). Congress allowed the BLM to continue its
operations without court scrutiny while this legislation was in
effect. Four years and five months have passed, and Congress has
withdrawn its protection. The BLM must now complete its
130. Id. at 1502.
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court of appeals held that "substantial doubt about the congressional
intent [to bar this lawsuit] exists,""' and that section 314 neither explicitly
nor implicitly repealed any existing law.1 4 However, the court left open
whether plaintiffs' challenges to BLM's upcoming 200 timber sales
constituted challenges to "particular activities" or to plans."'
On remand, the district court concluded that BLM's failure to
consider "new, significant and probably accurate information" about the
risk of extinction facing the spotted owl was "arbitrary and capricious" and
violated NEPA.116 However, the court again concluded that section 314
barred plaintiffs' NEPA claim." 7 This time, the Ninth Circuit affirmed." 8
The court of appeals acknowledged that plaintiffs' NEPA claim was "not
phrased as a direct challenge to the existing plans."" 9 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that a victory for plaintiffs would mean that BLM would
be required to "suspend its management plans and prepare a supplemental
EIS," and that this constituted a challenge to the plans within the meaning
of section 314.120
Congress reenacted section 314 for fiscal year 1990, but the provision
expired on September 30, 1990, and was not replaced.' 2' In 1991, plaintiffs
renewed their NEPA claims in the litigation. Judge Frye first held that
because the Ninth Circuit had upheld her dismissal of the case, there was
no NEPA claim before her.'22 When plaintiffs moved for leave to file an
amended complaint, she held that section 314 constituted permanent
legislation that had not been repealed, and therefore still barred any
NEPA claim based on new information. Accordingly, she denied the
motion to amend.
23
On December 23, 1991, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 24 The court
explained:
(1989).
113. Id. at 306.
114. Id. at 307.
115. Id. at 307-08.
116. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F.Supp. 1456, 1485 (D. Or.), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990).
117. Id. at 1489.
118. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1026 (1990).
119. Id. at 1237.
120. Id. at 1239.
121. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 4, at 487-90 (discussing the efforts to enact a similar
restriction on existing environmental laws for fiscal year 1991).
122. Portland Audubon Soc'yv. Lujan, 21 Envtl. L. Rep.(Envtl. L. Inst.)21.341,21,343(D.Or.
May 8, 1991).
123. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, No. 87-1160-FR (D. Or. July, 16, 1991)(order and
opinion denying plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint).




BLM and the timber industry appealed. The Ninth Circuit heard oral
argument on the appeals on November 4, 1992, but has not yet issued a
decision.
IV. THE FOREST SERVICE, § 318, NFMA, AND NEPA
In December 1988, the Forest Service adopted a Record of Decision
(ROD) and Final Supplemental EIS (FSEIS) for a new plan to manage
the spotted owl on the National Forests in Oregon and Washington as part
of the Regional Guide for Forest Service Region Six. The ROD and FSEIS
were strongly criticized by many scientists as scientifically insupporta-
ble." 2 The Secretary of Agriculture declined to accept administrative
appeals of the ROD and FSEIS. Accordingly, in early 1989 a coalition of
environmental organizations filed suit, alleging the Forest Service had
violated NEPA, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).
A. § 318
District Court Judge William Dwyer granted a preliminary injunc-
tion in March 1989 forbidding 140 imminent timber sales and set a trial
date for June. 33 However, before the case could be resolved on the merits,
FWS proposed to list the owl under the ESA.13 1 In addition, Congress
stepped in with a second appropriations rider, section 318.135 The statute
sought to insulate Forest Service and BLM actions from judicial review for
twelve months.
Section 318, Congress' first recognition of spotted owls and ancient
forests, required the Forest Service to minimize fragmentation of the most
ecologically significant old-growth stands.' 36 Portions of section 318 also
designated extra acres for spotted owl habitat in lands under Forest Service
131. Id. at 1508-10.
132. For example, Dr. Daniel Goodman, an expert in population dynamics, concluded that the
FSEIS "does not constitute a scientifically acceptable [population] viability analysis. Quite the
contrary, it is rife with elementary errors in statistics, mathematics and population dynamics. These
errors are of sufficient magnitude to invalidate the conclusions of the entire process [of evaluating the
owl's status]." Declaration of Dr. Daniel Goodman at 3, Washington Audubon Soc'yv. Robertson, No.
C89-160-WD, 1991 WL 180099 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 1991)(copy on file with author).
133. Seattle Audubon Soe'y v. Robertson, No. C89-160-WD (W.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 1989)(or-
der on motions for preliminary injunction and for change of venue).
134. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,666, 26,670 (1989).
135. Dep't of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989).
136. Id.
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and BLM management' 3 7 and established citizen advisory panels to make
recommendations to both federal agencies.' 81
The heart of section 318, subsection (b)(6)(A), provided that
"[w]ithout passing on the legal and factual adequacy" of existing Forest
Service and BLM plans,
Congress hereby determines and directs that management of
areas according [to the sections designating certain BLM and
Forest Service lands as protected for the owl] ... is adequate
consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory require-
ments that are the basis for the consolidated [spotted owl]
cases.
139
Based on this provision, Judge Dwyer dissolved his preliminary injunction
in November 1989.141 Judge Frye, ruling in the PortlandAudubon Society
litigation, followed suit and dismissed the complaint against the BLM.
141
In September 1990 the Ninth Circuit reversed both district courts in
Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson.142 The court of appeals held that
section 318 was an unconstitutional intrusion into the decisionmaking
process of Article III courts, as articulated by the Supreme Court's
decision in U.S. v. Klein."4 ' At the time, all but approximately sixteen
timber sales from the Forest Service's fiscal year 1990 program - and all
of the BLM's timber sales - had already been sold.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari144 and, in March 1992 re-
versed the Ninth Circuit's decision. 45 The Court avoided "any broad
question of Article III jurisprudence," holding instead that Congress "did
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. § 318, 103 Stat. at 747. The provision refers specifically to "Seattle Audubon Society et al.
v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale
Robertson, Civ. No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case Portland Audubon
Society et al. v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-FR." Id.
140. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, No. C89-160-WD (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6,
1989)(order).
141. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,018 (D. Or. Dec.
21, 1989)(order, opinion and judgment).
142. 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
143. Id. at 1316 (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872)). In a related
decision, Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson, 931 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1991), the court held that the
15-day limitations period for challenging timber sales previously offered pursuant to section 318 during
Fiscal Year 1990 was equitably tolled while the statute's unconstitutional provisions barred access to
the courts. However, plaintiffs later waived their challenges to all but a few of these sold sales in
connection with their request for prospective injunctive relief. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing,
Vol. I at 15,24, Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash.), a ff'd 952 F.2d 297
(9th Cir. 1991).
144. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, Il l S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
145. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
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amend applicable law" in section 318.146
Ultimately, the Supreme Court's decision is likely to become a minor
footnote in the spotted owl controversy. Because it dealt with a statute that
expired by its own terms at the end of fiscal year 1990; because it affected
only sixteen timber sales; because both the Seattle Audubon Society and
Portland Audubon Society cases have proceeded to judgment on the
merits; and because Congress is unlikely to repeat section 318 for political
reasons, Robertson has little importance to either the current litigation or
legislative proposals now pending in Congress.
B. SAS v. Evans: A Court Finally Reaches The Merits Of The
Forest Service's Owl Management Strategy
During 1990, while the constitutionality of section 318 was being
litigated in the Ninth Circuit and both the Seattle Audubon Society and
Portland Audubon Society cases were otherwise quiet, the owl's listing
under the ESA became final.147 In addition, the Interagency Scientific
Committee to Address the Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl
issued its Report. 148 The ISC Report concluded that the owl is "imperiled"
across its range as a result of logging, and that existing owl management
strategies of both the Forest Service and BLM (which were based on the
SOHA network system) were "a prescription for the extinction of spotted
owls."1 49 The ISC concluded that the "best management" for the owl
would be to "preserve all stands of mature and old-growth timber within
the range of the species and to grow more such stands as soon as
possible,' 150 but proposed an alternative land management strategy that
would still allow substantial logging to proceed under new guidelines. 151
On October 3, 1990, the Forest Service published an announcement in
the Federal Register, declaring it was "vacat[ing]" the 1988 ROD and
FEIS, and amending all existing forest plans under N FMA "to incorporate
this vacation."' 52 Finally, the Forest Service stated that it "will conduct
timber management activities in a manner not inconsistent with the" ISC
recommendations.' 5 3
The plaintiffs in Seattle Audubon Society amended their complaint
and moved for summary judgment, charging that (1) the Forest Service
had still never prepared an adequate EIS on the owl; (2) the agency had
146. Id. at 1414 (emphasis added).
147. Final Rule, supra note 7, at 26,114.
148. ISC REPORT, supra note 11.
149. Id. at 39.
150. Id. at 11.
151. Id. See supra note 14.
152. 55 Fed. Reg. 40,412, 40,413 (1990).
153. Id.
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violated the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) by failing to
follow the procedures specified for amending forest plans and had failed to
assure the viability of the owl pursuant to NFMA's diversity provision
154
ao implementing regulations; 155 and (3) the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
BTA) and the Administrative Procedure Act prohibit the Forest
Service from killing or otherwise "taking" spotted owls in the absence of
appropriate regulations consistent with applicable international treaties.
The Forest Service countered that the owl's listing under the ESA relieved
it of any obligation under NFMA to maintain viable populations and that
its Federal Register notice constituted a set of guidelines and standards
indistinguishable from a regional guide, and that the MBTA did not apply.
1. The ruling on summary judgment
In March 1991 Judge Dwyer granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs on their NFMA claim. 56 First, the court held that NFMA and
the ESA impose related, but distinct, obligations on the Forest Service:
NFMA, passed three years after ESA, directs the Secretary
of Agriculture to promulgate regulations to provide for diversity
of plant and animal communities in order to meet overall
multiple-use objectives. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). To that
end, a regional guide is required for each administratively
designated Forest Service region to provide standards and
guidelines for forest planning .... A minimum requirement is
that [f]ish and wildlife shall be managed to maintain viable
populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate
species in the planning area. §§ 219.13, 219.19 .... To insure
viability, habitat must be provided to support at least a minimum
number of reproductive individuals.
The duty to maintain viable populations of existing verte-
brate species requires planning for the entire biological commu-
nity - not for one species alone. It is distinct from the duty,
under the ESA, to save a listed species from extinction.
... NFMA was enacted three years later than ESA, and
nothing in its language or legislative history suggests that
Congress intended to exclude endangered or threatened species
from NFMA's procedural and substantive requirements. The
regulations under NFMA explicitly address endangered and
threatened species. They do not suggest that ESA alone governs,
154. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (1988).
155. 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.13, 219.19 (1992).
156. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, No. C89-16OWD, 1991 WL 180099 (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 7, 1991) (order on motions for summary judgment and for dismissal).
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or imply any conflict between the two statutes.
The record shows that the Forest Service has understood at
all times that NFMA continues to apply after a species is listed
under ESA."5 '
Second, the court held that the Forest Service violated NFMA's
procedures by changing its management plan (via the Federal Register
notice) without providing for public participation. 158 The Forest Service,
the court concluded, lacks "the power to omit procedures required by law
when it believes they would be unnecessary or inconvenient."'' 59
NFMA mandates a thorough process with participation by
the public, the government, and the scientific community. The
aim is to ensure both an informed public and an informed agency.
See 36 C.F.R. § 210.6(a)(1), (2). The Forest Service here did
not follow any of the procedures required before publishing the
notice and announcing that it would act 'not inconsistently' with
the ISC report.' 60
Third, because NFMA procedures require an EIS when the Forest
Service amends a regional guide, the court held it need not reach the merits
of plaintiffs' NEPA claim.' 6'
Finally, the court held that the MBTA's prohibition against "taking"
owls "at any time, by any means or in any manner" in the absence of
appropriate regulations, did not apply to harm caused by habitat degrada-
tion.'62 The district court did not address the MBTA's concurrent
prohibition against "killing" listed birds.
2. The ruling on injunctive relief
Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction barring further Forest
Service timber sales in spotted owl habitat, pending the agency's adoption
of a legally valid management plan and EIS. Following the court's ruling
granting summary judgment to plaintiffs, the timber industry asked for an
evidentiary hearing on the scope of injunctive relief. After an extensive
evidentiary hearing at which experts on extinction and economics from all
sides testified, the court issued its ruling on May 23, 1991.1 3
The court made several significant findings. First, the court found "a
157. Id. at *6.
158. Id. at *13.
159. Id. at *9.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *13.
162. Id. at *12.
163. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd, 952 F.2d 297 (9th
Cir. 1991).
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remarkable series of violations of the environmental laws" by FWS and the
Forest Service.1 4 The court noted the testimony of agency scientists that
earlier owl management plans had been subject to "a considerable - I
would emphasize considerable - amount of political pressure to create a
plan ... which had a very low probability of success and which had a
minimum impact on timber harvest,"'6 5 and that the Forest Service had, at
the express direction of the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture,
abandoned efforts to prepare an EIS in 1990 following the owl's listing and
issuance of the ISC report.' 6  The court found:
More is involved here than a simple failure by an agency to
comply with its governing statute. The most recent violation of
NFMA exemplifies a deliberate and systematic refusal by the
Forest service and the FWS to comply with the laws protecting
wildlife. This is not the doing of the scientists, foresters, rangers,
and others at the working levels of these agencies. It reflects
decisions made by higher authorities in the executive branch of
government.16
7
Second, the court concluded that the owl "is now threatened with
extinction.' 68 Moreover, the ISC Strategy, while "the first scientifically
respectable proposal regarding spotted owl conservation to come out of the
executive branch," has not been adopted by any federal agency, and has
"not been put to the test of public comment and hearings."'6 9 The Strategy
"may or may not prove adequate. While it is endorsed by well-qualified
scientists, it is criticized by others, equally well-qualified, as over-
Dptimistic and risky." '' Finally, "[t]o log tens of thousands of additional
acres of spotted owl habitat before a plan is adopted would foreclose
:ptions that might later prove to have been necessary."' 7 1 Indeed, "[t] here
is a substantial risk that logging another 66,000 acres, before a plan is
adopted, would push the species past a population threshold from which it
-ould not recover.' 72
Third, the court concluded that the economic effects of enjoining
Forest Service timber sales in owl habitat would be "temporary and can be
mninimized in many ways."'n In particular, the court noted the availability
164. Id. at 1089.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1090.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1091.
169. Id. at 1092.
170. Id. at 1093.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1093-94.
173. Id. at 1096.
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of a supply of timber under contract (but uncut) that would last about
nineteen months at 1990 logging rates that would be unaffected by the
injunction,'7" and the availability of additional timber supplies from




Moreover, the court noted that "[j]ob losses in the wood products industry
will continue regardless of whether the northern spotted owl is
protected.' ' 6
Finally, the court determined that the Forest Service could complete a
new owl plan that would comply with NFMA by March 1992.'~ r The court
concluded:
The Forest Service here has not taken the necessary steps to make
a decision in the first place - yet it seeks to take action with
major environmental impact.
The loss of an additional 66,000 acres of spotted owl habitat,
without a conservation plan being in place, and with no agency
having committed itself to the ISC strategy, would constitute
irreparable harm, and would risk pushing the species beyond a
threshold from which it could not recover.
Any reduction in federal timber sales will have adverse
effects on some timber industry firms and their employees, and a
suspension of owl habitat sales in the national forests is no
exception. But while the loss of old growth is permanent, the
economic effects of an injunction are temporary and can be
minimized in many ways ....
To bypass the environmental laws, either briefly or perma-
nently, would not fend off the changes transforming the timber
industry. The argument that the mightiest economy on earth
cannot afford to preserve old growth forests for a short time,
while it reaches an overdue decision on how to manage them, is
not convincing today. It would be even less so a year or a century
from now.' 78
On December 23, 1991, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.' 79 The court
rejected the government's contention that listing of a species under the
ESA relieved the Forest Service of its obligations under NEPA:
The effect of the Forest Service's position in this litigation, were it
to be adopted, would be to reward the Forest Service for its own
failures; the net result would be that the less successful the Forest
174. Id. at 1094.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1095.
177. Id. at 1096.
178. Id.
179. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Service is in maintaining viable populations of species as required
under its regulations, the less planning it must do for the diversity
of wildlife sought by the statute. This is directly contrary to the
legislative purpose of the National Forest Management Act ....
... The ESA list is not a list of animals t6 be written off. It is a
mandate for all agencies involved to take aggressive steps to
avoid a species' extinction and preserve its viability ..
The Agency's systematic refusal to follow the law in the
past, as chronicled by the district court, is not an excuse for its
avoiding the concurrent requirements of the NFMA and ESA in
the future.'80
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' claims under the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA). The court distinguished between the
definitions of "take" in the MBTA and in the ESA,181 noting that only the
latter explicitly prohibits habitat modifications. 82 The court held that "the
differences in the proscribed conduct under ESA and the MBTA are
"'distinct and purposeful.' "183 Accordingly, the court concluded that
"[h]abitat destruction causes 'harm' to the owls under the ESA but does
not 'take' them within the meaning of the MBTA."' 84 Like the district
court, the Ninth Circuit ignored both the MBTA's separate proscription
against "killing" listed species, and the record establishing that logging
killed spotted owls.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion left in place a sweeping multi-state
injunction against timber sales in spotted owl habitat on national forests.
The injunction dwarfed the earlier court rulings that had prompted
Congress to protect the BLM and Forest Service from judicial review with
section 314 (in 1987) or section 318 (in 1989). Yet, when the Bush
Administration and the timber industry tried again to override the courts
through special legislation, Congress demurred. s 5 Nothing illustrates
180. Id. at 301-02.
181. The M BTA makes it illegal to "pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or
kill" any listed bird species, except as permitted by a valid permit issued pursuant to regulations. 16
U.S.C. § 703 (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 21.11 (1992). FWS' regulations implementing the MBTA, in turn,
define "take" as to "pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect," or to attempt any such
act. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1992).
In contrast, "take" under the ESA is much broader. It includes habitat modification and
destruction. 16 U.S.C. §1532(19)(1988)("harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill ...."); 50
C.F.R. §17.3 (1992)(defining harm as including "significant habitat modification or degradation..
182. Evans, 952 F.2d at 303 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1992)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 4, at 485-90 (discussing the political battles that
eliminated sections 314 and 318 from the legal landscape).
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better how far the political debate over the ancient forests had moved since
the first filing in 1987 than Congress' refusal to bail out the federal agencies
in 1991.
C. Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley: The Forest Service Fails
to Cure The Problem
The Forest Service issued its draft EIS for a new owl management
plan in late September 1991 and a final EIS in January 1992. In early
March 1992 the Forest Service issued a new Record of Decision (ROD),
adopting the ISC Strategy as its new management plan for the spotted owl
on Forest Service lands.
Citizens' groups challenged the new EIS and ROD in Seattle
Audubon Society v. Moseley,186 asserting that (1) the EIS violated NEPA
by inadequately disclosing uncertainty and risks associated with the
Strategy, and by ignoring significant scientific criticism; (2) the ROD
violated NFMA because it inadequately protected other old-growth
dependent species for which the owl is an indicator by knowingly adopting
an owl management plan for which the FEIS gave only a "low to medium-
low" likelihood of protecting the viability of those other species; and (3) the
Forest Service violated NFMA by failing to adopt measures for preventing
the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat designated by the
FWS under the ESA.
1 87
1. The ruling on summary judgment
On May 28, 1992, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment.1 88 The court held generally that the Forest Service's new EIS
failed to address "[a] chief concern of scientists of all persuasions...
whether the owl can survive the near-term loss of another half-million acres
of its habitat."1 9 In particular, the court held first that the EIS failed to
address the implications of the decision of the BLM and the Endangered
Species Committee to proceed with sales likely to jeopardize the continued
survival of the spotted owl, as determined by FWS. Indeed, the EIS itself
stated that a decision by the ESC to exempt jeopardy sales for BLM would
render the viability rating for the Forest Service's decision "optimistically
high," and concluded that "[i] f the Endangered Species Committee were
to grant BLM an exemption.., this viability assessment would need to be
reconsidered."' 90
186. 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1476 (W.D. Wash. 1992)(complaint filed Mar. 25, 1992).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1484.
189. Id. at 1478.
190. Id. at 1480 (quoting FEIS).
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Second, the court examined demographic information developed
since the ISC's report, notably, an assessment by Doctors Anderson and
Burnham of FWS. That study concluded that the owl's population decline
was even more serious than previously believed, throughout its range, and
that the rate is increasing. As Dr. Anderson summarized the concerns:
Substantial and accelerating rates of population decline raise
serious questions about the adequacy of the ISC Conservation
Strategy . . .. The very high degree of fragmentation of the
remaining habitat may be the most likely cause of the declining
populations. It seems questionable if further harvest of remain-
ing suitable habitat is possible without risking, at least, local
extinctions. 9'
Other experts, including those within the Forest Service, agreed that this
information "brings into question the viability rating for the EIS on the
ISC strategy."' 92 However, the EIS neither mentioned nor discussed this
information. As the court concluded:
The agency's explanation [of its failure to address this
information] is insufficient under NEPA - not because experts
disagree, but because the FEIS lacks reasoned discussion of
major scientific objections .. .. NEPA requires that the agency
candidly disclose in its EIS the risks of its proposed action, and
that it respond to adverse opinions held by respected scientists....
The agency may not rely on conclusory statements unsupported
by data, authorities, or explanatory information . . .. The
Anderson and Burnham report is important enough that highly
qualified experts, including some in the employ of the Forest
Service, believe it means the ISC Strategy must be revised. This
being so, the agency cannot merely say that the report and the
criticisms arising from it make no difference; to comply with
NEPA, it must give a reasoned analysis and response.1 93
Third, the court approached the Forest Service's treatment of other
old-growth dependent species under NEPA, not NFMA. Noting that the
only discussion of these species in the entire EIS was an assertion that they
would have only a "low to medium-low" prospect of surviving under the
plan adopted by the Forest Service, the court concluded:
The FEIS has thus mentioned what appears to be a major
consequence of the plan -jeopardy to other species that live in
the old growth forests - without explaining the magnitude of the
191. Id. at 1481 (quoting Dr. Anderson).
192. Id. at 1482 (quoting Forest Service's Dr. O'Halloran).
193. Id. at 1482-83.
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risk or attempting to justify a potential abandonment of conser-
vation duties imposed by law. An EIS devoid of this information
does not meet the requirements of NEPA.' 94
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that NFMA
imposed any obligation to develop guidelines for protecting habitat
designated as critical under the ESA beyond complying with opinions
issued by FWS in consultations under ESA section 7(a)(2). The court
concluded: "In the interaction between [the Forest Service and FWS], the
Forest Service satisfies its duty under [NFMA regulations 36 C.F.R.]
§§ 219.27(a)(8) and 219.19(a)(7) if it and the FWS comply fully with the
consultation requirements of [ESA § 7(a)] 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)."' 95
2. The ruling on motion for permanent injunction
On July 2, 1992, the court issued a permanent injunction stopping the
Forest Service from proceeding with timber sales in spotted owl habitat
until it cures the NEPA defects identified in the court's summary judgment
ruling. 9' At the outset, the court elaborated on its holding regarding the
agency's obligations to other old-growth dependent species. The court
noted that NFMA requires the Forest Service to manage its federal lands
to "provide for diversity of plant and animal communities,"'197 and that the
NFMA implementing regulations provide that "[f]ish and wildlife habitat
shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native and
desired non-native vertebrate species. . ... "' The court held that "[t] his
duty 'requires planning for the entire biological community - not for one
species alone.'. . . To adopt a plan that would preserve a management
indicator species... such as the spotted owl, in a way that exterminated
other vertebrate species would defeat the purpose of monitoring to assure
general wildlife viability.' 99
The court explained:
These public lands belong to the entire nation. In enacting
NFMA Congress viewed them from the perspective not of a day
but of generations. Many observers have noted the Forest
Service's habit of maximizing timber production at the cost of
the other statutory values.... But such a practice, no matter how
194. Id. at 1483. The court elaborated on this issue in its order granting plaintiffs' motion for
permanent injunction, discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 196-203.
195. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. at 1484.
196. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (Memorandum
Decision and Injunction).
197. Id. at 1488 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B)).
198. Id. at 1489 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219.19).
199. Id.
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long it may have gone on, cannot change what the statute
requires.
NFMA and the regulations direct that the forests be
managed so as to preserve animal and plant communities.
Millions of acres of national forest lands in Regions Five and Six
do not consist of spotted owl habitat and are suitable for logging.
. .. Congress's mandate for multiple uses, including both logging
and wildlife preservation, can be fulfilled if the remaining old
growth habitat is left standing; it cannot be if the old growth in
any national forest is logged to the point where native vertebrate
species cease to exist there.
The records of this and other reported cases show that
management of the national forests in compliance with NFMA is
vital because other measures are inadequate for many species.
Parks and wilderness areas alone are too small to permit the
spotted owl to survive. ... The efforts of the [FWS] under the
[ESA] come only after a species is threatened or endangered and
fall short of systematic management of a biological community..
.. In this sense the national forests offer a last chance.2 00
Finally, the court rejected the Forest Service's defense that the low
viability rating for other old-growth dependent species merely reflected the
opinions of others - and was not the government's own view of the
situation:
That is what makes this a NEPA question rather than one
under NFMA at this stage. If the 'low to medium-low' viability
rating were admittedly the Forest Service's own rating, summary
judgment under NFMA would be entered now. Full NEPA
compliance may or may not lead to a plan different from [the
alternative adopted by the Forest Service]. Whatever plan is
adopted, it cannot be one which the agency knows or believes will
probably cause the extirpation of other native vertebrate species
from the planning areas.21
With respect to injunctive relief, the court determined that little had
changed from its previous decision in Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans:
The Forest Service now seeks to do the same thing it sought a
year ago - to sell further logging rights in spotted owl habitat
areas, consistent with the ISC Report, while the agency is in the
process of arriving at a conservation plan.... While some of the
statistics have changed in the past year, the basic facts remain:
Irreparable harm will occur if more owl habitat is logged without




a plan in place; timber volume under contract but uncut in the
seventeen national forests at issue still exceeds three billion board
feet; the FEIS states that the agency can sell more than 800
million board feet annually from lands that are not spotted owl
habitat; raw log exports from Washington and Oregon ports in
1991 totalled about 2.5 billion board feet and could be reduced in
a variety of ways; demand for wood products remains flat; and if
demand rises a corresponding rise in stumpage prices will
probably make more private timber available.
... The Forest Service's request that it be allowed to sell
logging rights without a legally-adopted plan in place must be
considered in light of the agency's past statements that its
proposals would allow the spotted owl to survive, followed by its
later admissions that they would not.2"2
Thus, the court enjoined all upcoming timber sales in spotted owl
habitat, while the Forest Service revisits the issues identified in the court's
opinion. Judge Dwyer gave the agency until August 1993 and required
quarterly reports to disclose its progress.203
3. What next?
Attention now shifts to two other fora. First, the Forest Service and
the timber industry have appealed both the district court's summary
judgment and injunction rulings. Plaintiffs, in turn, have cross-appealed
the court's ruling on the relationship between NFMA and ESA critical
habitat, as well as the court's treatment of other old-growth dependent
species as a NEPA, rather than a NFMA problem. The Ninth Circuit
heard oral argument on these issues on November 4, 1992, but no decision
has issued yet.
Second, the Clinton Administration held a Presidential Forest Con-
ference in Portland, Oregon, on April 2, 1993.204 At the end of the
Conference, the President directed his agencies to develop and adopt a plan
for the ancient forests that is "scientifically sound, ecologically credible,
and legally responsible. ' 20 5 As of this writing it is too early to tell whether
the agencies will comply with the President's directive.
202. Id. at 1491-92.
203. Id. at 1499 (order on compliance schedule).
204. See, e.g., The White House, Forest Conference Agenda, Background and Participants
(Apr. 2, 1993)(copy on file with the author).
205. Clinton Remarks Stress Unity, The REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Apr. 3, 1993, at 5A
col. 4.
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V. LESSONS FROM THE OWL EXPERIENCE
Both the text and the subtext of the spotted owl litigation contain
important lessons about how federal agencies have abdicated their
responsibilities toward the environment in the past, and what they must do
to avoid repeating these mistakes in the future. The public - and future
Administrations - must learn these lessons if federal agencies are to
effectively address the problems of failing ecosystems around the country.
The cases highlight both the limits of thejudiciary and the importance
of litigation in reviewing actions of federal agencies. They illustrate the
need for a holistic approach by federal agencies to both the law and the
land. Finally, the agencies should learn these lessons quickly, because
Congress is unlikely to relieve federal land managers of their duty to
comply with the law again.
A. The Limits of Litigation
The first lesson concerns the limits of litigation. Environmental groups
have often been accused of seeking, through the spotted owl litigation, to
have the courts manage federal lands. This charge seriously misses the
mark. The courts are institutionally incapable of making management
decisions delegated by Congress to the discretion of executive agencies,
and none of the spotted owl litigation has sought to undercut the
appropriate role played by the agencies and the courts.
Litigation plainly cannot require federal agencies to excercise their
[awful discretion in the wisest or most environmentally protective manner,
nor, for that matter, in any particular way. Rather, courts intervene only to
.orrect misconduct so egregious as to constitute an abuse of the discretion
vested by Congress in the Executive Branch. Institutionally, the judiciary
-an only enforce the irreducible minimum requirements of a statute. The
iramatic series of court rulings finding agncy violations of environmental
aws concerning the spotted owl illustrates how far below that irreducible
,ninimum federal conduct fell during the past decade.
Courts can correct serious abuses of the laws, like the "deliberate and
;ystematic refusal by [federal agencies] to comply with the laws protecting
wildlife"20 6 found in the spotted owl cases. The courts cannot, however,
•equire good or wise - much less the best or wisest - stewardship of the
,ublic's lands, where Congress only sets the lower boundaries of executive
liscretion.,
206. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (W.D. Wash.), afl'd, 952 F.2d
.97 (9th Cir. 1991).
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B. The Role of Litigation
The second lesson is that despite the institutional limitations of the
judiciary, progress has occurred over the last six years regarding the
spotted owl and federal land management in the Northwest only following
lawsuits. As a direct result of environmental lawsuits, the spotted owl now
enjoys the protection of the Endangered Species Act. The Forest Service is
finally developing a new spotted owl management plan, and is now
addressing the national forests as communities of species, only after being
found in violation of both the National Forest Management Act and
NEPA. The BLM has been enjoined from offering timber sales in spotted
owl habitat in two lawsuits - in one for violating the Endangered Species
Act and in the other for violating NEPA.
Ideally, each of these lawsuits should have been unnecessary. Most
involved no novel or complicated questions of law; all involved clear, well-
established obligations under existing laws that the FWS, BLM, and
Forest Service understood but chose to ignore. Both the public and the
environment would have been better served if the government had simply
complied with the law from the outset.
C. The Need For Holistic Ecological And Legal Approaches To
Public Land Management
The third lesson is that agencies should integrate all applicable legal
standards and plan for the survival of all affected species at the outset. The
spotted owl cases have involved the conduct of four federal agencies - the
Fish & Wildlife Service, the BLM, the Forest Service, and the Endangered
Species Committee - under several different statutes - the Endangered
Species Act, NEPA, NFMA, and others. Frequently, legal problems have
arisen because the agencies tried to proceed under only one legal mandate,
while ignoring other applicable duties. Thus, for example, the BLM strove
to comply with the timber dominant purposes of the Oregon & California
Lands Act, to the exclusion of NEPA.2 0 7 Similarly, the Forest Service
asserted that once a species was listed under the ESA, the agency's own
viability regulation under NFMA no longer applied
s.20
The agencies' legal myopia, moreover, has accompanied a similarly
narrow management approach that has focussed on crisis management for
individual species, rather than integrated management of whole biological
communities. The shortcomings of this approach are evident both in the
207. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992) (rejecting BLM
argument that O&C Act overrode NEPA's obligation to update environmental documentation),
modified in part, No. 87-1160-FR, 1992 WL 176353 (D. Or. July 16, 1992).
208. See Seattle Audubon Soc'yv. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting Forest Service
position).
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most recent spotted owl rulings, which for the first time order the Forest
Service not to delink its indicator species (the spotted owl) from other old-
growth dependent species, 209 as well as in other litigation focussing on
other species, like the marbled murrelet.21 0
A more sensible approach to both the legal and ecological issues would
have been for the agencies to plan systemically, and to address all
applicable legal standards - and all affected species on the public's lands
- at the outset. Such an approach would have avoided litigation, and
would have served the agencies, the public, and the environment far better.
D. An End To Court-Stripping Legislation
The final lesson is that placing federal agencies above the law will not
solve ecological and legal crises. The early years of the spotted owl
controversy focused largely on congressional efforts to close the courthouse
doors to citizens seeking to enforce federal enviornmental laws against
federal agencies. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the constitutional-
ity of this practice. Indeed, the Bush Administration made attacks on the
existing environmental laws a cornerstone of its federal land management
policy.
Fortunately, Congress has evidently kicked the habit of short-term,
temporary fixes to environmental issues. Congress, therefore, is unlikely to
try to resolve long-term or whole-ecosystem problems by exempting
federal agencies from judicial scrutiny. Thus, federal agencies should not
look to Congress for relief from their own misconduct.
CONCLUSION
The significance of environmental litigation can be judged by its
effects on both governmental conduct and public debate. By these
standards, litigation over the spotted owl has played a crucial role.
Litigation catalyzed public agencies to abandon outdated management
strategies now viewed as a "prescription for the extinction of spotted owls."
Litigation compelled those agencies to stop selling timber from spotted owl
habitat until they develop and adopt scientifically responsible management
strategies. Litigation brought to public attention a "remarkable series of
violations of the environmental laws." For the first time, the biological and
economic arguments of the environmental community, the government,
and the timber industry have been aired in a public forum on a level playing
209. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (ruling on
;ummary judgment); id. at 1494 (ruling on motion for stay).
210. In Marbled Murrelet v. Lujan, environmental groups challenged the failure to protect
nurrelet's viability in existing forest plans. Marbled Murrelet v. Lujan, No. C91-522R (W.D. Wash.
3ept. 17, 1992) (memorandum opinion granting plaintiffs' second motion for summary judgment).
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field.
In addition, litigation has focused judicial and public attention on
Congress' use of short-term court-stripping provisions as substitutes for
solutions to important long-term environmental problems. Litigation has
catalyzed Congress to finally consider long-range solutions for the North-
west's ancient forests, and helped inspire the upcoming forestry summit
sponsored by the new Administration.
The best legacy of the litigation over the spotted owl would be wise
management of the public lands. Management that strives to comply with
- rather than avoid - the requirements of all applicable federal laws at
an ecosystem level would better serve government agencies, the public, and
the species that reside on the nation's lands. It would also make future
litigation unnecessary - or, if brought, unsuccessful.

